Automatic License Plate Readers

Overview

Automated License Plate Readers (ALPRs) are cameras that capture images of all passing license plates, storing details like the car’s location, date, and time. These cameras collect data on millions of vehicles—regardless of whether the driver is suspected of a crime. While these systems can be useful for tracking stolen cars or wanted individuals, they are mostly used to track the movements of innocent people.

ALPRs are a threat to your privacy and civil liberties. They’re regularly used to track everyone’s movements without a warrant, probable cause, or reasonable suspicion.

These examples illustrate that it can be difficult to put meaningful restrictions in place that prevent ALPRs from being used for nefarious purposes.

• Texas police used Flock ALPRs to track a woman who had an abortion across state lines
• A police officer used Flock Safety ALPRs to stalk his estranged wife in Kechi, KS
• A police officer accepted a bribe to run a woman’s license plate in Georgia
• A police officer used ALPRs to stalk his ex-girlfriend in Ohio
• California agencies keeping data longer than necessary and sharing it with unauthorized agencies
• Police in San Diego County breaking the law sharing drivers’ data

ALPR misread errors have led to dangerous police encounters, including pulling guns on innocent drivers. Here are just a few examples:

• San Francisco Woman Pulled Out of Car at Gunpoint Because of License Plate Reader Error
• Cops Terrorize Black Family but Blame License Plate Reader for Misidentifying ‘Stolen’ Vehicle
• Deputies Sued After False ALPR Hit Leads To Guns-Out Traffic Stop Of California Privacy Activist
• Privacy advocate sues CoCo sheriff’s deputies after license plate readers target his car stolen

Police agencies frequently share ALPR data with ICE, putting undocumented people at risk, even in states where this is legally prohibited:

• ICE Taps Into Flock’s Nationwide Camera Network, Data Shows
• Police in Pasadena, Long Beach pledged not to send license plate data to ICE. They shared it anyway.
• Documents Reveal ICE Using Driver Location Data From Local Police for Deportations
• New report finds data sharing with federal immigration agencies might violate Washington law

Police do not need a warrant to search these cameras. The data collected by ALPRs is owned by the police department, and law enforcement agencies can access it without a warrant. There is often no oversight at all on how these searches are conducted, raising concerns about their constitutionality under the Fourth Amendment.

The data collected by ALPRs can be shared with other law enforcement agencies and third parties, further extending the reach of this surveillance. This raises significant privacy concerns, as most individuals are not aware that their movements are being monitored and recorded.

What does this look like in Tucson? What can I do?

This network feeds data about Tucson drivers into an AI-driven national database marketed by Flock Safety to law enforcement agencies and other private organizations.

The UofA has contracted with Flock Safety and put up over at least 47 ALPRs. This number was half at the start of the summer. (Deflock Map) When contacting UofA administration for further information, Chief Safety Officer, Steve Patterson, was asked for clarification on the usage of automated license plate readers on campus, and refused to provide further information. They advised to contact the Office of the President who also refused to provide clarification and redirected the search for answers to the Public Records Department. The Public Record Department stated there would be definite delay on obtaining any information about the usage of these cameras on campus.

We urge you to pressure your city council members and the Office of the President to disclose the terms of its contract with Flock Safety, and to align its data-gathering agreement with Flock with the ACLU’s best practices.

Reference: https://deflock.me/